What happened in Ukraine on the eve of the war is happening in Georgia

AFTER Russia launched an invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Georgia had good reasons to strongly condemn the aggressor and support the victim in every way. Just 14 years earlier, the former Soviet republic also experienced Russian aggression, which after five days of unequal conflict ended in a ceasefire and Georgia’s loss of 20 percent of its national territory.

However, the exact opposite happened, and the events of the last two years indicate that the destinies and trajectories of Georgia and Ukraine are greatly intertwined, primarily in domestic political turmoil and decades of turbulent relations with a powerful neighbor.

Georgia first condemned Russian aggression, but…

Although Georgia at first declaratively condemned the Russian invasion, the government led by the centrist Georgian Dream party soon sided with Moscow, with which it maintains mostly close diplomatic and trade relations today.

Not only has Georgia not accepted the sanctions against Russia, but it has been refusing to help Ukraine in any way for two whole years. The Georgian government even rejected Ukraine’s request to return the air defense system it received to help defend against a Russian attack in 2008.

Justifying the move, then-Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili said that joining Western sanctions and providing aid to Ukraine would only harm his country and people. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky subsequently recalled the ambassador from Tbilisi and called this decision immoral.

Mass protests in Tbilisi

And yet, the mass protests against the authorities that have been going on for days in Tbilisi indicate that Georgian society is not unique in siding with Russia. Hundreds of thousands of protesters clash daily with police, who use water cannons, tear gas and rubber bullets, over the controversial “foreign influence transparency” bill.

If the law enters into force by the end of May, as Georgian Dream announces, all associations, institutions and organizations in the country will have to publicly declare payments from abroad that exceed 20 percent of their annual budget. The Georgian opposition, led by the pro-Western and liberal United National Movement, claims that the bill is designed to silence and stifle any political and social resistance. A similar law in Russia is used to punish government critics and persecute independent media.

Strong support for the Georgian government is coming from Moscow. Alexander Dugin, a Russian philosopher close to the Kremlin, claims that “Georgia is on the right track” due to the adoption of the aforementioned law. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov blamed the West for causing “anti-Russian feelings” among Georgians, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov expressed his support for the government’s intentions.

In order for the law to become valid, it must pass the third reading in the Georgian parliament, and then it should be signed by the Georgian president, Salome Zurabishvili, who has promised to veto it. But thanks to the majority in the parliament, the Georgian Dream can override the veto and pass the law. On the day of the third reading, May 17, the largest protests are expected in Tbilisi.

Everything reminds of the Maidan

The link between the Georgian protests and the events on Kyiv’s Maidan Square from November 2013 to March 2014, which brought about complete paradigm changes in Ukrainian society and politics, is quite clear.

The Ukrainian president at the time, Viktor Yanukovych, a loyal ally of Russian leader Vladimir Putin, caused the displeasure of pro-European citizens and the opposition by refusing to sign an agreement on cooperation and rapprochement with the European Union.

Months of protests turned into a revolution with street clashes, human casualties and brutal police repression, which ultimately brought to power a pro-Western political option, namely Ukrainian presidents Petro Poroshenko and Zelensky.

However, at the end of February 2014, Russia occupied the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea practically without resistance, and then encouraged separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions to raise an uprising against the government in Kiev. A war followed, in which more than 14,000 people died on both sides, and which lasted with greater or lesser intensity until the total Russian invasion.

The bitter experience of the Russian invasion

In addition to the mountain experience of Russian aggression in 2008, Georgian society shares with Ukrainian society a long history of pro-European orientation, and Western governments and international organizations invested a lot of effort, time and money to move this country on the border of Europe and Asia away from Russian influence.

After all, Georgia applied for membership in the European Union together with Moldova at the beginning of March 2022, and has been closely cooperating with NATO for decades. One poll from the beginning of 2023 showed that 75 percent of Georgians still support integration with the West, while only two percent of citizens declared themselves pro-Russian.

Although the official policy of the Georgian government is still pro-European, since Georgian Dream took power in 2012, little has actually been done to bring it closer to the European Union and NATO. Analysts believe that Georgia decided on a clumsy attempt to protect its economy and avoid provoking Moscow. However, everything indicates that there is a dangerous appeasement and yielding to the Russian threat.

A dangerous policy of appeasement

Former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger described appeasement as “a foreign policy of appeasement and at the same time risking worsening the situation in the country through negotiations to prevent war”. This policy has been resorted to by many regimes and leaders throughout history, but it has rarely been successful and justified in the long run. However, considering the unpleasant experiences of the recent past, which called national survival into question, just like in the Ukrainian case, do Georgian elites even have a choice?

Allegedly, then Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili misinterpreted American support in the elections and in 2008 caused a disastrous war with Russia. He came to office largely on promises to re-establish control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia, two Georgian regions that have been controlled by ethnic separatists since the early 1990s. Russian troops quickly responded to the Georgian attack and came only 50 kilometers from the capital Tbilisi.

Who is to blame for the war is still debated

After only five days, Georgia was forced to ask for a truce. There are still debates whether the short-lived conflict was caused by Russian provocations or the aspiring Georgian president, but the trauma of the defeat still lingers in the Georgian national consciousness.

Russia then recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, stationing its soldiers in these regions. The tactics that Russia used in an attempt to destabilize Georgia, they will later apply in Ukraine.

On the other hand, precisely because of Ukraine’s experiences with Putin’s regime, Georgia cannot ignore that it shares a border with Russia that is almost 900 kilometers long and that it can quickly and effectively act against its southern neighbor from the aforementioned rogue regions.

The lukewarm reaction of the West is a big strategic mistake, encouraged Putin

It is the lukewarm reaction of the West to the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 that is today considered a major strategic mistake that encouraged Vladimir Putin and prepared the ground for aggression against Ukraine. Fifteen years later, a resurgence of Russian influence in Georgia could convince Putin that despite his stumbles and setbacks, he will eventually achieve his goals in Ukraine.

The influence of Russian propaganda in the Georgian information space is another problematic issue that is particularly visible in the rehabilitation of the Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin. For years, the Putin regime promoted a revisionist approach to Stalin, portraying him as a strong leader whose merits in defeating Nazi Germany in World War II outweighed his horrific crimes.

Given his Georgian origins, Stalin is still considered a kind of representative of Georgian nationalism, although such a claim has little basis in reality.

In recent years, 11 monuments to Stalin have been erected in Georgia

The fact that 11 new monuments to Stalin have been erected in Georgia in recent years sounds paradoxical, and a recent poll showed that almost 46% of respondents agree that “patriotic Georgians should be proud of Stalin”. Stalin died 71 years ago and his regime has long since been condemned by history, but this example indicates the vulnerability of Georgian society to Russian information warfare and fertile ground for narratives from the Kremlin.

That is why it would be wrong and short-sighted to once again downplay the geopolitical changes that are currently taking place in Georgia, as well as the considerable possibility of a new Russian invasion. Although Russian war resources are mainly engaged in Ukraine, Georgia is a small country (it has only about four million inhabitants) and for a possible successful military provocation, not necessarily an invasion, huge Russian forces are not necessary.

The Georgian dream likes to present itself to the nation as the only barrier against another Russian aggression ahead of parliamentary elections in October 2024. It is quite clear that Putin is not comfortable with another neighboring country taking the path of joining the European Union or NATO. That would be an open threat to him. And this is where the events in Ukraine and Georgia are intertwined again.

If Putin establishes dominance in Georgia, why wouldn’t he succeed elsewhere?

Russian failures in the war with Ukraine in the coming months would embolden and embolden pro-European forces and open the possibility for the Georgian opposition to win this year’s parliamentary elections. In addition, Georgian President Zurabishvili said not long ago that a peace deal for Ukraine must include Russia’s withdrawal from Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which are at the heart of Georgia’s national interests.

As Giorgi Kandelaki, a former Georgian parliamentarian, warned a few months ago, the alternative would be disastrous for Georgia, Ukraine and Western interests. If Putin succeeds in re-establishing Russian dominance over Georgia and preventing that country’s Euro-Atlantic ambitions, why wouldn’t he be able to do something similar in Ukraine and other neighbors?